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This paper presents empirical findings on gender differences in time preference and 
time inconsistency which are based on international chess data from 1.5 million expert games. 
Controls are included for age, nationality and playing strength where the latter accounts for 
gender differences in productivity. Impatience is measured by considering preferences for 
different game durations. Inconsistency is measured by exploiting the 40
th move time control, 
where over-consumption of thinking time is inefficient. The results reveal that men are more 
impatient while women are more time inconsistent. Moreover, the difference in impatience 
increases with expertise while the difference in inconsistency decreases.   
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1. Introduction
 
We have all experienced moments of regret at leaving unpleasant tasks for later although we 
know we would be better off in the long run by doing them now.  This is also true for pleasant 
tasks, or rewards, which we tend to carry out, or consume, earlier than we would prefer in the 
long run. Such acts are said to be due to self-control problems as we are just too tempted by 
the present utility to care about the long-term utility. We also know that people differ in 
degrees of impatience as some people seem to be able to wait patiently while others want 
instant action. The theory of economic preferences distinguishes between time preference and 
time consistency.  
Time preference measures impatience or when in time we prefer to act. This is modeled 
with a discount factor where a lower discount factor means that we are more impatient and 
therefore value sooner higher than later. Our discount factor is the same over any two periods 
whenever in time we are asked. The concept of time consistency builds on the same premises 
but adds a second parameter to distinguish between the present and the future. There is no 
difference between time preference and time consistency as long as we are time consistent. 
The difference occurs when we are time inconsistent. The implication of an inconsistent 
behavior is that the discount factor changes in the present period compared to future periods.  
Contrary to the concept of time preferences, time inconsistency distinguishes between 
short- and long-term values. Angeletos et al. (2001) give a neat example. When we go to bed 
at night most of us set the alarm to wake us up at a certain time. Nevertheless, when the alarm 
sounds some of us just hit the snooze button, pull up the duvet and go back to sleep. We then 
tend to hit the snooze button repeatedly until we have to skip the healthy breakfast, have a 
swift cup of coffee and lock the door at the same time as we put our coat on. In this case, we 
consume too much time (a pleasant activity), to the point where we experience subjective 
discomfort in the shape of stress. If, when programming the wake-up time the night before,   4 
we intended to wake up the first time the alarm sounded but failed to do so by hitting the 
snooze button, then the behavior is time inconsistent as our long-term preferences are not 
consistent with our short-term preferences. However, if we intended to snooze for a while 
before getting up then the behavior is time consistent as our preference did not change during 
the night. In practice, it may be difficult to observe whether there was an intention to snooze 
or not, which may be one explanation as to why there are so few empirical studies on time 
inconsistency, especially across gender.  
Akerlof (1991) writes that time inconsistency could contribute to “poverty of the elderly 
due to inadequate savings for retirement, addiction to alcohol and drugs, criminal and gang 
activity, and the impact of corporate culture on firm performance.” If one of the sexes is more 
impatient or time inconsistent than the other then consumption and savings could differ 
substantially during a lifetime. With their empirical paper, Ashraf et al. (2006) showed that 
the saving behavior can indeed be affected by time inconsistency. In addition, they find that 
women are, or at least consider themselves to be, more time inconsistent.
1
                                                 
1 See also DellaVigna & Paserman (2005) for an empirical work on time preferences, Benzion et al. (2004) on 
time inconsistency and Croson & Gneezy (2009) for an overview of gender differences in economic preferences.  
 In his theoretical 
paper, Strotz (1956) was the first researcher to suggest that people are more impatient in the 
short run than in the long run. Pollack (1968) and Phelps and Pollack (1968) gave an early 
formal model of time inconsistency which has later been extended and refined by Akerlof 
(1991), Laibson (1997), Fischer (1999) and Barro (1999). The research results on time 
preference and gender diverge somewhat although there is some indication of male students 
being more impatient than female students. However, in an influential paper by Harison et al. 
(2002), no gender difference in discount factor was found when looking at a more 
representative (general) sample. The purpose of this paper is to examine potential gender 
differences in time preferences (impatience) and time inconsistency by using an extensive 
dataset from international chess played by expert chess players.   5 
To model impatience and time inconsistency, I use the theoretical stepping stone 
suggested by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). The degree of impatience in chess is measured 
by observing the game duration in moves when holding constant for gender differences in 
productivity (playing strength). Choosing to end the game early is assumed to be a signal of 
impatience and vice versa. To account for possible gender differences in risk aversion and 
aggressiveness, I also run a sensitivity check where I include a control for risk aversion in line 
with Gerdes and  Gränsmark (2010). To study gender differences in time inconsistency I 
exploit the fact that the time available to each player in a chess game is restricted. At the 40
th 
move there is a time control requiring at least 40 moves to have been played within the first 
two hours. A player can consume or save time and I investigate to what extent women and 
men end up in time trouble just before the time control at the 40
th move.  
The results show that men have a significantly lower discount factor and are thereby 
more impatient than women. Women are more time inconsistent and the fact that I cannot 
give any formal proof that the time inconsistency is really due to self-control problems is, at 
least partly, compensated by the findings showing that the effect decreases with increasing 
expertise. The gender differences in impatience, on the other hand, increase with expertise.   
In experimental  studies addressing discounting over time, it is common to include 
money as a means of measuring the degree of impatience. When doing so it is important to 
control for wealth, as a potential gender difference in impatience could otherwise be due to 
the fact that differences in wealth can lead to a different valuation of money. The time frame 
must typically be rather large as it would be difficult for most people to perceive a difference 
from one day to another. In a practical experiment $100 now is the same for most people as 
$100 a few hours later (the problem of just perceptible differences). For this reason, the 
experiments are abstract, i.e., the participants are supposed to imagine an abstract time period 
of, for instance, one year. If the experiments were to last for a whole year it would be   6 
impossible to control for changing factors in the lives of the participants as they could not be 
isolated from the world for a year. In a chess game, that usually lasts for a few hours, and no 
money is involved so the effect of wealth does not play an important role here.
2
The snooze example given by Angeletos et al. (2001) is an example of a “few-hours-
game” (lasting for about eight hours), a game length perfectly comparable to the one in a 
chess game. Most experiments on time consistency use questions like “Would you prefer 
$100 today to $110 in a year?” By varying the amount it is possible to obtain an image of 
people’s impatience. The drawback with such a method is that it measures people’s attitudes, 
not their actual behavior. Economists primarily want to know how people really act, not how 
they think they act. With the dataset in this paper it is possible to measure actual behavior, i.e., 
we can observe how the players have actually played, not how they think they should have 
played.  
  As a 
corollary, there is no need to study agents for a longer time period. The longer the time frame 
in an experiment, the higher the risk that external conditions will change, with obscure impact 
to follow. Consequently, when using chess data we do not have to worry about wealth, 
remaining lifetime or different perceptions of the interest rate when measuring discounting 
over time.   
For  a number of years strategic aspects involved in playing chess have become an 
established analytical tool in cognitive psychology. A landmark for establishing chess as an 
analytical tool was the introduction of the so called “Elo” scale that made it possible to 
compare the strength of chess players on a metric scale. Following on from the work of Elo 
(1978), it has become possible to measure skills on objective grounds, i.e., there are no 
                                                 
2 The prize money in chess levels below the absolute world elite can be ignored as it is too small to be important 
in this context.     7 
“subjective assessments” (Chabris and Glickman 2006, p. 1040).
3
  “Chess has numerous strengths for the purposes of econometric analysis. First, the outcomes 
are clear and objective: a win, a draw, or a loss. Moreover, a perfect record of all games is available 
for virtually all important championship and high-level tournament games of the modern era. Most 
important of all is that there exists a rating system that is a precise and accurate reflection of the 
performances of players and an excellent indicator of the relative strengths of players. These ratings 
are the best unbiased estimates of relative strengths and the differences in ratings correspond to the 
likelihood that the stronger player will defeat the weaker (cf. Elo 1978). These Elo-style ratings have 
since been applied not only to other sports but also to studies of revealed preference rankings in 
college selection.” (Moul and Nye 2009, p. 11). 
 In a study by Moul and Nye 
(2009) the authors write that:   
 
As argued by different scholars in the field, e.g., Gobet (2005), Ross (2006) and Roring 
(2008), chess has the potential to be applied to questions that concern issues even outside the 
world of chess. For example, one result resolved by chess research is that it takes about ten 
years of intense learning and hard work to become an expert, a time frame that also fits into 
“arts, sports, science, and the professions” (Gobet 2005, p. 185).  
Undoubtedly, chess players constitute a selected group which is not representative of 
the whole population. Nevertheless, one may argue that there is a common denominator 
between chess players and employees in intellectually demanding professions. Furthermore, it 
has recently become more common to look at highly skilled athletes and sports competitions 
for the purpose of analyzing economic issues. For example, Duggan and Levitt (2002) look at 
corruption in the world of sumo wrestling by analyzing the frequency of arranged draws. The 
authors recognize that sumo wrestling in itself is not of much interest in economics but that 
                                                 
3 The Elo rating is calculated through an algorithm that starts out from the assumption of a normal distribution of 
the chess players’ strength. It takes into account the difference in current Elo between the two players (before the 
game) and the result of the game (1-0, 0-1 or ½-½). Elo points are then added or subtracted to the players’ Elo 
score. Consequently, the Elo rating is a cardinal measure that evolves over time. An Elo rating that is superior to 
the rating of the opponent by 200 points corresponds to a winning probability of 75 percent.   8 
economists can learn about the impact of corruption by studying it. From a game theoretical 
point of view, Levitt et al. (2009) focus on expert chess players in a lab experiment where 
they investigate whether it is reasonable to test backward induction through the centipede 
game. 
Compared to sports economics, chess has the advantage that different groups can be 
compared more easily as there is no requirement of physical strength. Men and women can be 
compared on an equal basis which is not always the case in sports economics. Indeed, chess is 
one of the  few competitive events which  men and women enter in direct competition.
4
This paper aims to contribute to the literature by studying gender differences in two 
related topics: time preference and time inconsistency. This is done by employing a large, 
international and non-experimental panel data over eleven years. The main advantage of this 
dataset is the Elo rating which makes it possible to hold constant for gender differences in 
productivity. In addition, the control variables for age, nationality and individual fixed effects 
contribute to reduce the impact of other confounders such as cultural differences.  
 
Moreover, the rules in chess are the same all over the world which facilitates comparisons 
ever further.  
   The next section provides a theoretical background while Section 3 discusses the data 




The theory of time inconsistency builds on the theory of exponential discounting. It is 
modified to account for the fact that people tend to give a higher weight to the present than 
the future. This is usually the case in exponential discounting as well but in that case it does 
                                                 
4 For a discussion about women’s situation in the chess world, see Shahade (2005).    9 
not matter when in time the agent is asked, the discounting is always the same. In the model 
of exponential discounting, let 
t U  be a person’s utility in period t. In period t we do not only 
care about our present utility, but also about our future utilities. Let 
t U ( T t t u u u ,..., , 1 + ) 
represent a person’s intertemporal preferences from the perspective of period t, where 
t U  is 
continuous and increasing in all components. Formally, the model is defined as:  






t u u u u U
τ
τ
τ δ ) ,..., , ( 1   
where δ∈(0, 1] is a discount factor. t denotes the time period of interest (the current period) 
and τ  the time period in which the activity is carried out. A δ smaller than one is interpreted 
as impatience by economists.  
By considering the duration of a chess game it is possible to obtain an image of the 
impatience of the players, i.e., an impatient player will strive to end the game earlier than a 
patient player. The utility when looking at impatience in a chess setting equals the outcome of 
the game, i.e., a win, a loss or a draw (1, 0 or ½ a point respectively). Since the short-term 
utility, as defined here, only appears once (a game only ends once), the short- and long-term 
utilities are related as  t
t
t
t u u U δ ≡ ) ( . Controlling for playing strength, the short-term utilities 
for men and women are the same, i.e., they score equally well. The period t is represented by 
the number of moves, i.e.,  the higher the number of moves,  the later the period. The 
relationship between the discount factors for each sex can then be calculated. Let  fem δ be the 
female and  mal δ the male discount factor and φ and  λ the average number of moves (the time 
period t) when the game is ended for females and males respectively, where φ ,λ >0. Since 
mal fem u u λ φ = we have that 
λ φ δ δ mal fem = ⇒  
φ
λ
δ δ mal fem = . Thus, if  λ φ > , then  mal fem δ δ > , since 
δ <1. The implication is that if men end their games in fewer moves on average than women, 
then their discount factor is lower, indicating a more impatient behavior than for women. The   10 
first aim of this paper is to determine the relationship between φ and  λ  after controlling for 
productivity.   
The second aim concerns potential gender difference in time inconsistency which is 
said to occur when a person has self-control problems. An intuitive definition of time 
inconsistency was suggested by Solomon and Rothblum (1984):  “An act of needlessly 
delaying tasks to the point of experiencing subjective discomfort.” In line with the work of 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) I extend this definition to also include: carrying out a pleasant 
activity too soon to the point of experiencing subjective discomfort. To be able to measure 
possible gender differences in time inconsistency it is essential to be able to distinguish 
between short-term temporal utility and long-term intertemporal utility. A time inconsistent 
behavior implies that the short-term utility is not compatible with the long-term utility. 
Although we know what is best in the long run, sometimes we temporarily disregard the long-
term intertemporal utility in favor of the short-term utility.  
Time inconsistency is usually referred to as present-biased preferences (O’Donoghue 
and Rabin, 1999) or hyperbolic discounting
5
(2)    For all t, 
 (Laibson, 1997). It can be elegantly modeled by 









t u u u u u U
1
1 ) ,..., , (
τ
τ
τ δ β δ    
where  1 , 0 ≤ < δ β . As before, δ is the discount factor and can be set equal to 1 without loss of 
generality. β is the present-bias factor which equals 1 in the case of time consistency. In the 
case of time inconsistency β <1, indicating that the present utility is more important than the 
future utility. If β =1 then the (β, δ)–preferences are simply exponential discounting.   
                                                 
5 In the present model, it is rather a quasi-hyperbolic discounting as the β is constant over time.    11 
Increasing the move quality in the present period by consuming thinking time is 
considered to be an immediate reward in the framework by O’Donoghue and Rabin. If a 
person consumes time in period τ, then her intertemporal utility in period  τ ≤ t is  
(3)  = ) (τ
t U τ βc vt − , if  t = τ   or  = ) (τ
t U τ τ β β c v − , if t > τ   
τ is the time period when the action is carried out while t is the present time period. v is a 
reward schedule while c is the cost schedule.  
Almost a century ago the grandmaster Rudolf Spielmann stated that it is wrong to 
search for the best chess move in every position. One should only try to find a sufficiently 
good move.
6
 “…many leading grandmasters are so fascinated by chess that they cannot resist the 
challenge of finding the very best move in a position, even if this means spending up to an hour on a 
single move. Consequently they often end up having to make their last 10 or 15 moves in less than a 
minute.” (Webb 2005, p. 102) 
 In the search for the “perfect” move you will exhaust your energy and most 
probably end up in time trouble. This summarizes the dilemma for expert chess players. On 
the one hand, you want to find a “killer” move in the present position, and on the other hand 
you know that if you pursue this ambition you will probably lose due to bad moves later in the 
game when you run short of time and are forced to play without much reflection. This is a 
topical matter in the mind of any expert chess player. Most players at higher levels are aware 
of the fact that it is tempting to give in to the desire to search for the best move in the present 
position, but that such an impulse is dangerous to pursue as the clock is ticking. As the aim is 
to win the game, not to play good chess moves, the players constantly have to remind 
themselves not to give in to “romantic” impulses. Webb (2005) writes in his chess book that: 
 
                                                 
6 For an interesting discussion on the rational choice procedure of a chess player, see Simon (1955).     12 
Expressed differently, the task of an expert chess player is to maintain a constant, high quality 
game, not to play a few excellent moves followed by some less impressive moves under time 
pressure. In a context of time inconsistency this could be expressed as the choice between 
giving in to the short-term goal of finding the best move in the present position or the long-
term goal of playing a set of good moves that eventually wins the game.  
To obtain a measure of potential time inconsistency in chess, I exploit the existence of 
the time control limit at the 40
th move. In chess there is a time constraint where you have 
limited time at your disposal. In standard international chess each player has a maximum of 
two hours for the first 40 moves and then an additional 60 or 90 minutes for the remainder of 
the game.
7
“…many experienced players, including some grandmasters, seem unable to avoid getting 
into time-trouble game after game. As a result they regularly throw away good positions and fail to 
achieve the results of which they are capable.” (Webb 2005, p.100) 
 Under these conditions the maximum duration of a game would be six to seven 
hours. The two hours can be distributed among the 40 moves in the way the player wishes. 
Just as in exponential discounting, one can choose to consume or save time for each move. 
Time is the good that can be consumed or saved and each chess move represents a time 
period. It is possible to consume less time in the beginning of the game which can be used 
later in the game. If you consume (too) much time in the beginning of the game you could end 
up in time trouble when approaching the time control limit at the 40
th move. If fewer than 40 
moves have been played when the two hours end, the game is lost. Frequently, some players 
tend to fall short of time over and over again before reaching the 40
th move and as I argue 
below, this is due to self-control problems. It is not uncommon to see a player use about one 
hour and 45 minutes for the first 20 moves and then have to play 20 moves in only a quarter 
of an hour, while other players almost never end up in time trouble. Webb (2005) continues:  
 
                                                 
7 A chess clock contains two clocks, one for each player.    13 
Surprisingly often a superior position reached after hours of play is given away in just 
a few seconds in the last move(s) before the time control. It can be perfectly time consistent to 
win, draw and even lose a game. The time inconsistency occurs when you lose on time which 
was certainly not part of the plan when the game started. I assume that all games lost in the 
40
th move are due to time inconsistency. The fact that some of these games were lost in a 
natural manner (not due to time trouble) is not a problem as both sexes are expected to be 
equally affected (I control for playing strength through the Elo rating).  
The purpose of introducing a time control limit is reflected in the Chess Organiser’s 
Handbook.  
“[chess games without time limit] are rarely seen. Some players are extremely ill-disciplined 
and will end up making all the remaining moves in 5 minutes, even if they had 3 hours at the start. It is 
nannyism to prevent players doing this but someone has to exhibit a measure of control.” (Reuben 
2005, p. 54) 
 
In other words, by imposing the 40
th  move time control, the organizer forces a 
commitment upon the players to help them avoid getting trapped by the romantic task of 
finding the best move in every position.  
Thus, when modeling time inconsistency, the short-term utility increases with 
increasing consumption of time and is defined as:  ≡ t u the quality of the t
th move as a function 
of the time consumed for the t
th move. The intertemporal utility builds on an optimal usage of 
the disposable time and is defined as:  ≡ + ) ,..., , ( 1 T t t
t u u u U surviving the 40
th move time control.  
The chess player faces a maximization problem with a time constraint where the 
intertemporal utility is maximized with respect to the short-term utility. The two-hour time 
frame in which the 40 moves must be played constitutes the time constraint. To learn to 
master the maximization problem under the time constraint is an integral part of the process of   14 
becoming an expert chess player. That is, the players are very well aware of where and when 
they can and should spend time on a move and when they should not. Even if they 
miscalculate, they have access to the chess clocks at all times and can easily re-evaluate the 
distribution of time consumption and adjust accordingly.  
The assumption I make in this context is that it is not time consistent to lose a chess 
game on time. This assumption is not obvious and cases when it does not apply are discussed 
in the results section.  
In the econometric analysis, I use a Linear Probability Model (LPM) with a binary 
dependent variable which I choose to estimate by OLS for its transparency and 
interpretational simplicity. The LPM looks like:  
(4)      i i i i x d y ε γ β α + + + =      
where the dependent variable y is defined as yi = 1 if the result of the game i = win/loss/draw 
for a certain period (to be specified in each case, see the data section), zero otherwise. α is the 
intercept, di is the female dummy. xi are control variables and εi the (robust) standard errors. 
The female dummy coefficient gives the marginal probability for women to win/lose/draw 
compared to men in the estimated period. The control variables included in the model are: Elo 
rating (playing strength), Elo difference, age (age, age  squared, age  0–20  years  old), 
nationality and number of games played. As a sensitivity analysis I also include a control for 
risk aversion (aggressive opening strategy) in line with the conceptual framework of Gerdes 
and Gränsmark (2010). The games are treated as independent observations but as individuals 
play more than one game I employ clustered standard errors in the estimations.  
   15 
3. Data and Statistics
 
The data in this study were obtained from ChessBase 10, a database collection with 3.8 
million chess games played in international chess events. It contains about 200,000 players 
from 140 countries. Two levels of data are available: player-specific information and game-
specific information. The name, year of birth, nationality and gender of a player are available. 
For every game there are data on the names and Elo ratings of both players, year of the game, 
number of moves and score. The years included in this study range from 1997 to 2007 and the 
minimum Elo rating required is 2,000.
8
The regions with the highest number of chess players are Western Europe, Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union.
   
9 These three regions account for about 90 percent of the 
expert chess players in the world. Western Europe alone accounts for 45 percent, Eastern 
Europe for 27 percent and the former Soviet Union for about 18 percent.
10
Women have an Elo rating of about a hundred points lower than men, averaged over 
the whole population. The female share varies substantially across regions from about 5 
percent in Western Europe, to 10 percent in Eastern Europe and 14 percent in the former 
Soviet Union.  The female share for players with a playing strength of between 2,000 and 
2,300 is 12 percent while 5 percent for players stronger than 2,300. The overall female share 
is about 8 percent.  
 The remaining 10 
percent are from other parts of the world, mainly South and North America and Asia.  
Since the female share has been rising continuously in the last two decades women 
are much younger on average than male chess players. The average male is 35 years old while 
                                                 
8 An Elo rating of 2,000 corresponds to an expert level. An Elo rating of about 2,500 is required to become a 
grandmaster. The highest score ever reached by a human is 2,851 (Kasparov).   
9 As the USA applies a different rating system than the Elo, many American players are not included in the 
international dataset used here. 
10 See Table 1 in Gerdes & Gränsmark (2010) for further details.    16 
the average female is ten years younger. In the former Soviet Union the mean age is much 
lower and the difference between the sexes is not as large as in Western Europe.  
To model impatience I look at the game durations measured in moves which, for 
practical reasons, are divided into five-move intervals. Figure 1 presents the number of wins, 
losses and draws that are realized in each interval.   
 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
The mean game duration for women is about three moves longer, approximately 42 moves, 
(see Table 1) while men’s games end after 39 moves on average. The standard deviation is 
approximately the same. Table 1 also gives the mean game duration for two subgroups with 
different playing strengths. Roughly, the group with an Elo rating lower than 2,300 are expert 
amateurs and the higher rated group with an Elo rating higher than 2,300 are professionals or 
semi-professionals. The reason for looking at two subgroups is to see if there are differences 
between the groups and if the observed pattern changes with playing strength. For the 
professionals, the female games last about four moves longer than male games. For the 
amateurs the difference is smaller, about 2.5 moves.     
 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
   17 
When turning to time inconsistency, the critical period is the 40
th move and the moves around 
it (not intervals as when looking at time preferences). Table 2 presents descriptive statistics 
for each period. It gives the number of won and lost games played by both males and females. 
It also gives won and lost, female and male games for each period as a share of the total 
number of female and male games played.   
 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 
Figure 2 displays the number of male/female games for wins, losses and draws but where the 
number of male games has been divided by ten for easier comparison. Notice that, although 
there are only three outcomes in chess, in this context there is also a fourth outcome in each 





Figure 2 about here 
 
 
Figure 2a shows that men increase their number of wins substantially more than women in the 
critical period while Figure 2b shows that there is barely any gender difference in the number 
of losses. Although the 40
th period is the critical point for potential gender difference in time 
inconsistency, some of the effect is expected to spill over to the 41
st  period as it is not 
uncommon that the last moves before the time control are played so quickly that the player in 
                                                 
11 As a matter of fact, not ending the game in the current move is the most common outcome as only about 1 
percent of games end in a win, loss or draw. This typically produces small coefficients.      18 
time trouble does not have time to properly evaluate the position. Once the time control is 
passed, the player realizes that the position is lost (given that it is) and resigns. For this 
reason, some of the games won/lost due to time trouble are registered as won/lost in period 
41. This fact can be observed in Figure 2. Notice that the maximum for draws occurs in the 
41
st move. This is natural since under time pressure there is no time to either evaluate the 
position nor propose/accept a draw. Quite often the position on the board is clearly drawn but 
the player/s continue until the time control is reached in the hope of the opponent making a 
mistake.   
The regressions in the next section test if the descriptive patterns for impatience and 
time inconsistency remain after the inclusion of the control variables Elo, Elo difference age, 




This section starts by presenting the results on time preference (impatience) and then 
continues with the results on time inconsistency. The analysis of time preference begins with 
a regression where the game duration is regressed on the female dummy and controls (i.e., no 
LPM) with the purpose of obtaining a result in the shape of a single coefficient. This is 
followed by multi-regressions for different intervals of game durations for wins, losses and 
draws separately and also for amateurs and professionals. The analysis of time inconsistency 
starts by an LPM for wins and losses for different game durations around the 40
th move. To 
also take the draws into account this is followed by an ordered logit model where the total 
performance around the 40
th move is analyzed. Finally, I examine the performance when 
taking the gender of the opponent into account to see how men and women score against   19 
female and male opponents around the 40
th move. In these regressions it is possible to control 
for individual fixed effects which net out the effects that are constant over time.    
 
4.1 Time preference 
Table  3  shows the results when the game duration in moves is regressed on the female 
dummy and the controls, including playing strength. The first column of Table 3 shows that 
the game duration is about 2.5 moves longer for women and the coefficient is significantly 
different from zero. Columns (2) and (3) show that the gender difference in game duration is 
smaller among expert amateurs (about 1.5 moves) than among the professionals (about 3.5 
moves).  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
 
The coefficients in Table 3 change somewhat compared to the mean values  in Table 1 but the 
pattern remains, that is, there is a gender difference and it is smaller among expert amateurs 
than among professional players.
12
Figure 3 displays the female dummy coefficients from the main model of the paper 
(the LPM) where separate regressions are run for each move interval for wins, draws and 
 To see how sensitive the results are to differences in the 
female share, I have run the same regression on amateurs in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union where the female share is about 20 percent (compared to about 8 percent in the 
whole sample). The coefficient for the amateurs is 1.1598 with the standard error (.1628)*** 
which shows that the gender difference remains even when the female share is as high as 20 
percent.  
                                                 
12 Including a control variable for risk-aversion/aggressiveness only changes the results marginally.   20 
losses. A positive female dummy coefficient implies that the probability for women to end the 
game in the corresponding interval is greater than for men. The figure reveals a smooth, S-
shaped pattern where men prefer shorter games relative to women. The smoothed pattern is 
interrupted for draws in 10–19 moves, where men are heavily overrepresented. The 
explanation for this irregularity is to be found in the fact that men agree to pre-arranged or 





Figure 3 about here 
 
 
Thus, the probability for men to end games in 35 moves or fewer is greater than for women 
while the probability for women to end games in more than 40 moves is higher than for men.  
Table 4 gives the coefficients, robust standard errors and significance levels of the results 
displayed in Figure 3.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
 
These results suggest that  λ φ > , i.e., the female games last longer than the male games on 
average. As a result  mal fem δ δ > , i.e.,  the male discount factor is smaller than the female 
discount factor. The conclusion is that men are more impatient than women.  
                                                 
13 When running the regressions presented in Table 3 with a control for draws in less than 20 moves, the female 
coefficients decrease by about 25 percent and the significance level increases. The control for teenagers becomes 
insignificant in all models. Teenagers agree to pre-arranged draws to a lower extent.     21 
Figure IV shows the game duration (irrespective of outcome) for expert amateurs 
and professionals. The patterns for both groups follow the same S-shape as in Figure 3. 
Moreover, in line with the results presented in Table 3, it is clear that the gender difference is 
higher in the group with higher playing strength, that is, men are even more impatient relative 
to women among the professionals compared to the expert amateurs.   
 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
 
4.2 Time inconsistency 
When turning to time inconsistency, the outcome variable changes from game duration for 
five-move intervals over the whole move spectra to wins and losses for one-move “intervals” 
around the 40
th  move. Figure 5  displays the estimation results for the female dummy 
coefficients. Four separate regressions are run, one for wins and one for losses and for the 
higher- and lower-rated groups. For the amateurs the coefficient drops for wins at the 40
th 
move, indicating that the probability to win for women in the 40
th period is lower than for 
men. The difference is significant at the 1 percent level (see Table 5). Looking at losses for 
the amateurs, women lose more games compared to men in the 41
st move. As can be seen in 
Figure V the coefficient patterns for the amateurs for wins and losses are close to parallel for 
all moves except for the 40
th and 41
st move. For the professionals, however, there is barely 
any difference between the two curves. Although women win fewer games in the 40
th move, 
they also lose fewer games than men and there is no increase in losses in the 41
st move, as 
there is for the amateurs.
14
                                                 
14 The inclusion of a control variable for risk-aversion/aggressiveness only changes the results marginally. 
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Figure 5 about here 
 
 
As regards the draws (not reported in the figure), there are no significant gender differences in 
the moves 39–41 which implies that the results found in Figure 5 are not driven by changes in 
the pattern for draws.  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
 
Table 6 gives the results from an ordered logit model where the dependent variable is the total 
result, i.e., losses, draws and wins. For amateurs, there is a drop in winning probability for 
women in the 40
th, and to some extent also for the 41
st move. The coefficient for the amateurs 
in the 40
th move is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level (almost at the 1 
percent level). For the professionals, however, there is no clear pattern at all and none of the 
coefficients is significantly different from  zero. The results presented in Table 6  are 
convincing and they show that the time inconsistent behavior that is found for the amateurs 
disappears when looking at the professionals.  
 
 
Table 6 about here 
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The corresponding results for the amateurs in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
with a female share of 20 percent, is similar to the pattern for the whole population. The 
coefficients are insignificant for all moves except for the 40
th move where the coefficient 
estimate is -.1218 and the standard error (.0669)*. Thus, the gender difference in time 
inconsistency seems to remain even with a female share of 20 percent.  
As chess is a two-player game it is possible to observe the performance around the 
40
th move for men and women respectively, when controlling for the gender of the opponent. 
Figure 6 displays the MEN/WOMEN vs. female opponent coefficients for wins and losses 
when controlling for individual fixed effects. For the amateurs both men and women win 
more against female opponents in the 40
th or 41
st period compared to when playing against 
male opponents. Both men and women lose relatively less in the 40
th move when playing 
against female opponents. For the professionals the patterns are weaker and there is no sharp 
difference in the 40
th and 41




Figure 6 about here 
 
Let us hypothesize that women end up in time trouble more frequently than men. In such a 
case, and when two women play against each other, the probability that both players are in 
time trouble is greater than when two men or opposite-sex opponents meet. When both 
players find themselves in time trouble, then neither one is trying to decide the game at that 
point (in period 40). The objective is simply to pass the time control by making 40 moves in 
two hours which is required to obtain extra time. When only one of the players is in time 
trouble then the player without time trouble will try to find decisive or complicated moves to 
                                                 
15 There are few observations for women vs. women at the professional level which may explain the irregularity 
for those curves.   24 
force the opponent to make a mistake under time pressure.
16
 
 If the assumption that women 
end up in time trouble more frequently is correct, then they would simply prefer not to end the 
games in the 40
th period to the same degree as men would. To test this hypothesis I look at 
game duration which includes wins, losses and draws. The regression results are displayed in 
Figure 7 and they show that women end fewer games in the 40
th period when playing against 
a female opponent (the WOMEN female opponent coefficient) compared to when playing 
against male opponents.  
Figure 7 about here 
 
 
The intertemporal change between periods 39/40 and 40/41 is larger than any other two-
period change. The conclusion from Figure 7 is that women prefer to avoid time-requiring 
(decisive) moves in the 40
th period which indicates that women are more often in time trouble.  
In section 2, I made the assumption that losing on time is not a time consistent 
behavior. A relevant question is whether this assumption is reasonable or not. Are there 
situations when a loss on time is not a result of self-control problems? First, could it be that 
women are just worse at planning? Second, could it be the case that it is rational to adopt a 
plan which results in a time loss once in a while but that wins in the long run?  
For the gender difference found here to be due to self-control problems, it must be 
that the short-term utility is not compatible with the long-term utility. The definition of a time 
inconsistent behavior requires that we are aware of the divergence from the optimal short-
term behavior that results from self-control problems. If we are not aware of the optimal 
short-term behavior then the divergence cannot be said to be due to self-control problems. 
                                                 
16 Playing waiting moves under time pressure instead of first-best moves is a well-known phenomenon in chess, 
for example, move repetition where a piece moves back and forth. See for example Webb (2005) for a 
discussion.    25 
Being bad at planning, for instance, would be an example of a behavior that does not 
necessarily result from self-control problems. If women are worse at planning than men, then 
the results could be due to inferior planning skills rather than due to a time inconsistent 
behavior. However, expert chess players are very experienced and they have a well developed 
feeling for the optimal behavior. Under such highly competitive conditions, means have been 
employed to maximize productivity. Weaknesses and inefficiencies have been minimized 
through dedicated training. Moreover, the chess clocks and the remaining time can be 
observed during the whole game so it is easy to re-evaluate the remaining time and adjust 
accordingly should the conditions change. The most applied rule of thumb in chess as regards 
the planning of the time distribution is to simply divide the total number of minutes available 
between the number of moves that have to be played, i.e., 120 minutes/40 moves gives three 
minutes for each move. For these reasons, the planning is relatively easy, i.e.,  the time 
constraint and move requirements are perfectly known and the requirements on the cognitive 
skills necessary for planning are relatively low. Moreover, women, not men, are generally 
considered to be better at planning which would lead to the opposite result from the one found 
here.
17
As regards the second question as to whether it might be rational to adopt a time 
consumption distribution that more often leads to time losses, the fact that the gender 
difference in time inconsistency is considerably reduced for the professionals suggests that the 
phenomenon is inefficient and undesired. My interpretation is that players with a lower degree 
of self-control problems have a greater probability of reaching the higher ranks while those 
with a higher degree of self-control problems remain amateurs, to a larger extent.  
  
Although the observational dataset applied here may not be perfect for analyzing time 
inconsistency,  we should recall that in lab experiments we usually have to settle with 
                                                 
17 See Naglieri & Rojahn, (2001) and references given there.    26 
considerably fewer observations which often produce insignificant results. It is very difficult 
to obtain ideal conditions for analyzing time inconsistency for the reasons discussed in the 
introduction and both experimental and non-experimental studies are necessary to obtain the 
complete picture of potential gender difference. Whatever the underlying explanation to the 
findings, there is a gender difference which may be important to help us understand gender 





This paper finds that men are more impatient than women when it comes to ending a chess 
game and that the gender difference in impatience increases with expertise, that is, the gender 
difference is even greater among professionals. Furthermore, women lose more games on 
time than their male counterparts which I interpret as women being more time inconsistent. 
The time inconsistency, however, decreases with increasing expertise. For the professional 
players there is basically no evidence at all for gender difference in time inconsistency. My 
conclusion is that women are more time inconsistent than men among amateur players but 
only those with a low degree of time inconsistency reach the top ranks.  
It is not obvious how to interpret the size of the gender difference. At first sight the 
size may seem small but we should recall that the fraction of games actually ended in each 
period is very low,  producing seemingly low coefficients. In a single game the gender 
difference in impatience and time inconsistency has only a small impact but when cumulated 
over many games the difference may definitely be of importance. In relative probabilities, 
there seems to be a gender difference in impatience of about 5 percent for amateurs and about 
                                                 
18 Furthermore, the fact that the gender differences survive nationality controls makes it tempting to conclude 
that the behavior is universal. However, this does not necessarily mean that the difference is genetic, see, for 
example, Lundborg & Stenberg (2009) for a discussion.   
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10 percent for professionals (see Figure 4). The corresponding difference for time 
inconsistency would be about 10–15 percent for amateurs but close to none for professionals 
(see Tables  5  and  6). Nonetheless, as has been stated in the literature, also very small 
differences can lead to huge effects on savings in the long run. 
 From a theoretical perspective the findings imply that the discount factor in the model 
of exponential discounting is lower for men than for women, implying that men value future 
payoffs less than women. In the case of time inconsistency, the beta parameter in the 
theoretical model with present-biased preferences is lower for women than for men. This 
implies that, relative to men, women consume more time in the short run than they would like 
to do in the long run.  
One objection that could be raised against this study is that it focuses on a non-
representative selection of people. For this reason we should be careful not to generalize the 
results too far. Also, as the female share among chess players is low it is possible that the 
motivation that drives women into playing chess is different from the motivation that drives 
men. However, we should recall that the pattern remains when studying a subgroup where the 
female share is as high as 20 percent (see Section 4). The dataset also has a number of 
strengths as it contains international,  non-experimental data with a large number of 
observations in a panel data structure which allows controlling for nationality (individual 
fixed effects), age, gender and playing strength. The fact that it permits controlling for gender 
differences in productivity makes the findings very strong. Having such powerful econometric 
tools at hand in a two-agent game is rather rare in practice.  
There is some research on impatience across gender. Some studies have found that 
male students in small-scale experiments are more impatient than female students but Harison 
et al. (2002) found no significant differences in time preferences when looking at a more 
general population with a larger number of observations. To the best of my knowledge there   28 
is only one paper looking at time inconsistency across gender. Ashraf et al. (2006) found that 
women are more time inconsistent by showing that they are more prone to accept 
commitment savings as a means to avoid consuming more in the short run than they would 
like to do in the long run. Thus, their result is in line with the findings of this paper. Their 
paper and the present study nicely complement each other as they tackle the question from 
different perspectives. Ashraf et al. (2006) examine whether women consider themselves to 
be more time inconsistent while this paper measures the behavior ex post. More research on 
the subject is necessary but if it turns out that one of the sexes is more time inconsistent than 
the other, then the behavior could create gender differences in long-term savings, for instance, 
in pension plans for retirement.   
With the increasing popularity of online chess tournaments on the Internet, it might be 
possible in the near future to be able to observe the exact amount of time spent on each single 
move. That could give rise to some interesting further research which would be more precise 
than what is offered in this paper. The data on international chess games is very rich in 
variation and easy to quantify and there are still variables other than those used here. I think 
that this data could and should be further exploited by economists. After all, with concepts 
like rational choice and optimization, chess probably has more in common with economics 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for game durations in moves for different subgroups. 
Duration in moves  All    Amateurs, Elo<2300    Professionals, Elo>2300 
men  women    men  women    men  women 
Mean  39.07  41.97    39.06  41.52    39.09  42.91 
Stand dev  16.73  16.86    15.98  16.37    17.34  17.81 
No. of obs  1,423,567  125,369    646,273  84,552    777,294  40,817 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for wins and losses per period in absolute numbers and as shares. 
WINS  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 
No. of male games  12,952  13,123  13,634  16,804  14,871  11,765  10,591  9,711 
Males/ total males  .0102  .0103  .0107  .0132  .0117  .0093  .0083  .0082 
No. of fem. games  1,084  1,171  1,223  1,267  1,227  1,034  967  959 
Females/ total fem  .0093  .0101  .0105  .0109  .0105  .0089  .0083  .0076 
                 
LOSSES  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 
No. of male games  11,448  11,617  12,062  15,114  13,300  10,504  9,449  8,674 
Males/ total males  .0090  .0091  .0095  .0119  .0105  .0083  .0074  .0068 
No. of fem. games  1,171  1,214  1,281  1,439  1,379  1,138  1,052  1,003 
Females/ total fem  .0101  .0104  .0110  .0124  .0119  .0098  .0090  .0086 
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Table 3 
Game duration in moves regressed with OLS on the female dummy and controls.  
Dep var: game length in moves  all  Amateurs Elo<2300  Professionals Elo>2300 
       
Female  2.4491  1.5615  3.5431  
  (.1305)***  (.1181)***  (.2832)*** 
Elo  .0010  .0025  .0031   
  (.0003)***  (.0004)***  (.0009)*** 
Elo difference  -.0003  -.0015     .0009    
  (.0001)***  (.0001)***  (.0001)*** 
Age  -.1288  -.0416     -.1989  
  (.0161)***  (.0146)***   (.0341)*** 
Age-squared  .0013  .0004    .0019    
  (.002)***  (.0002)**  (.0004)*** 
Teenage  .3024  .3205     .4127    
  (.1165)***  (.1159)***  (.1854)** 
Number of observations  1,548,936  726,681  818,111 
Notes: Additional controls: number of games and nationality controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
clustered at player level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%. 
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Table 4 
Coefficients, standard errors and significance level for the results displayed in Figure IV. 
Female dum.  10-14  15-19  20-24  25-29  30-34  35-39 
Win  
 
-.0003  -.0017  -.0038  -.0053  -.0047  -.0002 
(.0001)***  (.0003)***  (.0004)***  (.0006)***  (.0007)***  (.0007) 
Loss  
 
-.0004  -.0016  -.0044  -.0049  -.0028  .0018 
(.0001)***  (.0003)***  (.0005)***  (.0007)***  (.0008)***  (.0008)** 
Draw 
 
-.0099  -.0104  -.0055  -.0023  -.0001  .0011 
(.001)***  (.0008)***  (.0008)***  (.0007)***  (.0006)  (.0006)* 
             
40-44  45-49  50-54  55-59  60-64  65-69  70-74 
.00003  .0019  .0022  .0019  .002  .0021  .0013 
(.0007)  (.0006)***  (.0006)***  (.0005)***  (.0004)***  (.0003)***  (.0003)*** 
.0039  .0038  .0042  .0041  .0027  .0026  .0014 
(.0009)***  (.0006)***  (.0006)***  (.0005)***  (.0005)***  (.0004)***  (.0003)*** 
.0028  .0032  .0026  .0027  .0015  .0019  .0016 
(.0007)***  (.0006)***  (.0005)***  (.0005)***  (.0004)***  (.0003)***  (.0003)*** 
Notes: Control variables are: Elo, Elo difference, age, age-sq, age 0-20 years old, number of games and 
nationality controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at player level. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5 
Female dummy coefficients and standard errors for wins and losses in periods 37–43. 
  37  38  39  40  41  42  43 
Elo<2300               
Loss female  -.0006  .00004  -.0001  -.0014  -.00002  -.00002  .00036 
  (.0003)*  (.0004)  (.0004)  (.0004)***  (.0004)  (.0004)  (.0003) 
               
Win female  -.0002  .0008  .0004  .0001  .0015  .0004  .0010 
  (.0004)  (.0005)*  (.0005)  (.0005)  (.0005)***  (.0004)  (.0004)** 
   
 Elo>2300               
Loss female  -.0005  .0004  .0003  -.0011  -.0002  .00003  -.0001 
  (.0006)  (.0006)  (.0006)  (.0006)*  (.0006)  (.0005)  (.0005) 
               
Win female  -.00066  -.0002  .0010  -.0010  -.0002  .0005  .00003 
  (.0005)  (.0005)  (.0005)**  (.0005)*  (.0005)  (.0005)  (.0005) 
Notes: Additional controls are: Elo, age, age-squared, teenager, number of games played and nationality 
controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at player level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6 
Female coefficients estimated by ordered logit for the total performance (win, loss and draw). 
  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 
Elo<2300                   
Female  -.0228  -.0550  -.0555  -.0424  -.1082  -.0775  -.0120  -.0243  -.0187 
  (.0458)  (.0472)  (.0472)  (.0477)  (.0437)**  (.0420)*  (.0472)  (.0473)  (.0499) 
No of obs  19,351  18,520  18,603  18,970  23,075  22,355  18,371  16,376  15,321 
                   
Elo>2300                   
Female  .0684  -.0014  .0165  -.0820  .0166  -.0096  -.0686  -.0337  -.0306 
  (.0629)  (.0674)  (.0643)  (.0664)  (.0627)  (.0596)  (.0581)  (.0698)  (.0722) 
No of obs  20,208  19,979  20,223  20,475  25,154  24,951  20,232  18,248  16,802 
Notes: Additional controls are: Elo, Elo difference, age, age-squared, teenager, number of games played and 
nationality controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at player level. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   38 
Figure 1 
Descriptive statistics: number of ended games (vertical axis) for wins/losses, draws and total 
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Figure 2 
a) the number of wins, b) the number of losses, c) the number of draws. The number of male 
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c) No. of draws at each game length (in moves)   
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Figure 3 
Female dummy coefficients from separate regressions for each five-move interval for wins, 
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 Figure 4 
Female dummy coefficients from separate regressions for each five-move interval. LPM 
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Figure 5 
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a) Amateurs: Coefficients for wins and losses at 
each game length. Female share: 15 percent.  
b) Professionals: Coefficients for wins and losses at 
each game length. Female share: 5 percent.   
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Figure 6 
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a) Amateurs, Elo<2300  b) Professionals, Elo>2300  
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Figure 7 
Ended games in periods 33–49, female dummy and MEN/WOMEN vs. female opponent 
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